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Abstract
This paper addresses the link between native attitudes and return migration. We
exploit the variation in xenophobia using information on media consumption by migrants
in Italy. A widely documented crime provides a quasi-experimental setting to identify
the impact of Italian attitudes on migrants’ settlement intentions. Our results suggest a
significant effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on the intended duration of stay in the host
country. The impact is more pronounced for low-skilled migrants, which has consequences
for how migration affects the long run convergence between sending and destination coun-
tries.
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1 Introduction
Do changes in natives’ attitudes towards immigrants affect the plans of foreign born to return
to their countries of origin? There is little evidence in the current literature to answer this
question. This is puzzling considering the economic importance of return migration and
the impact of return intentions on the integration of immigrants in their host society. The
self-selection of return migrants leads to important compositional changes in the cohorts
of foreign born who remain in their destination country compositional changes have major
consequences for labour markets in the host countries as well as for economic development
in the sending (often transition or developing) countries. Return intentions are positively
correlated with return realisations and are driven by the same determinants (Dustmann 2003).
However, none of the models of return migration (e.g. Borjas and Bratsberg 1996, Yang
2006, Dustmann, Fadlon, and Weiss 2011) incorporates the role of natives’ attitudes in the
out-migration decisions of foreign born. There is to date no empirical study of the effects
of natives’ attitudes on the flows of return migration. The formation of public attitudes
towards migration and their interaction with migration policy making have been the subject of
considerable research in economics (Facchini and Mayda 2008, Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter
2007, Facchini, Mayda, and Mendola 2013, Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2013). In this paper
we address precisely the missing link between explaining public attitudes towards migration
and assessing their impact on return migration.
We use the case of Romanian migrants in Italy to demonstrate how a sharp negative
shock in attitudes of Italians towards a specific group of foreigners impacts on their plans to
return to their home country or to settle at destination. Specifically, we compare migrants
with and without previous exposure to anti-immigrant stereotypes before and after a strong
negative shock in natives’ attitudes. The shock developed as a response to a crime committed
by a Romanian migrant in October 2007. The extensive media coverage of this event and
the duopolistic nature of Italian television provide us with a quasi-experimental setting to
identify the impact of natives’ attitudes on return intentions. We find a significant impact
of the change in attitudes on migrants’ plans to stay in Italy. Moreover, unskilled migrants
seem to be affected more by the shock than highly skilled migrants.
The paper most related to ours in spirit is Friebel, Gallego, and Mendola (2013). They use
a similar set-up to analyse the impact of xenophobic attacks in the host country on emigration
from the source country. For the case of Mozambique, they identify a significant reduction in
emigration intentions after a series of xenophobic attacks targeting immigrants in the regions
of destination, in South Africa. Our findings also complement the results of Gorinas and
Pytlikova (2013) who analyse the link between native attitudes and migration flows in a cross-
country setting. They conclude that natives’ hostility, measured by the extent of potential
labour market discrimination, reduces migration inflows. Several other studies confirm the
importance of migration intentions and their role in predicting actual migration (e.g. Burda
et al. 1998, Gordon and Molho 1995)
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Our paper provides, to our knowledge, the first empirical evidence linking natives’ at-
titudes to return intentions. In this context, the case of Romanian migration to Italy is
particularly relevant. Starting from the turn of the century in 2000, Romanian migrants be-
came the largest group of foreign born in Italy. Italy is by far the most important destination
country for emigrants leaving Romania. The overall share of the foreign-born residents in
Italy grew dramatically from 0.8 per cent in 1990 to more than 7 per cent in 2010. This sharp
increase in a short period of time was accompanied by raising anti-immigrant attitudes among
the native population. For example, in 2007, Italians were overwhelmingly considering immi-
gration as a worrying problem in their country. Migrants from the Middle East, North Africa
and Eastern Europe were perceived as having a detrimental impact on Italy (Horowitz 2010).
The immigration-crime nexus has been a salient issue of the Italian media landscape.
It is historically highly polarized (Hallin and Mancini 2004) and characterised by partisan
bias (Durante and Knight 2012). Television is the most popular information medium
for a large proportion of the Italian population (D‘Avanzo (2007), Centro Studi
Investimenti Sociali (2007)). Italian TV is dominated by two networks - RAI, the state
broadcaster and Mediaset, the largest commercial media company in Italy, controlled by Silvio
Berlusconi. The RAI channels subscribe to a public service mission and attempt to cover in a
balanced way themes around race, immigration and diversity. In contrast, Mediaset news
programmes in particular devoted much more prime transmission time than RAI
programmes to crime and security issues (Durante and Knight 2012) often linked to crimes
committed by immigrants or to illegal immigration (Diamanti 2008). We use this contrast
in the presentation of immigrants between RAI and Mediaset to account for differences in
immigrants’ exposure to stereotyping and negative attitudes towards their community. The
shock in attitudes and media coverage from October 2007 allows us to construct a difference-
in-differences (DID) model in which we exploit the increased exposure to anti-immigrant
attitudes for migrants who have been using RAI channels as main source of information.
A number of recent studies have stressed the role of media exposure in shaping migration
choices and attitudes. Farre and Fasani (2013) uncover a causal negative relationship between
TV exposure and internal migration decisions in Indonesia. They attribute this link to im-
perfect information suggesting that TV exposure mitigates the individual valuation of gains
to migration. Facchini, Mayda, and Puglisi (2009) find evidence supporting the correlation
between media exposure and attitudes towards illegal migration in the US. Hericourt and
Spielvogel (2014) demonstrate that media is a crucial explanatory factor in the formation of
beliefs about the economic impact of immigration. In Italy, Mai (2001, 2004) describes how
the media, especially television, had a major impact on the expectations, perceptions and
overall migration experience of Albanian migrants.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents relevant stylized facts on
flows and stocks of Romanian migrants in Italy. It also introduces the particular context of the
analysis. Section 3 presents the data, some descriptive evidence and the method applied for
the estimation. Section 4 discusses the results and the limitations of our approach. In Section
3
5 we present additional results and robustness checks. Section 6 presents our conclusions.
2 Background and motivation
2.1 Stylized facts on Romanian migration to Italy
According to the World Bank - Migration Factbook 2011, international migration flows be-
tween Romania and Italy form one of the top ten European "migration corridors". While
these flows started by the mid 1990s, they developed continuously until Romania’s EU ac-
cession in 2007. Between 1992 and 2007, Romanians together with Albanians were the two
nationality groups experiencing the largest increase among the foreign born population in
Italy (Bettin 2011).
However, during this period, Romanians became the largest immigrant community in
Italy. Figure 1 illustrates the stocks of migrants in Italy by country of origin at the level of
2011. In just one decade before 2008, the incidence of Romanian migrants rose by more than
15 times, while the overall foreign population in Italy more than quadrupled.
Over the same period of time, Italy represented by far the most important destination
country for Romanian migrants. Data from the 2011 Romanian census suggest that almost
50 per cent of the Romanian migrants identified as being abroad in the census year were
residing in Italy (see Figure 2). These very large flows were accompanied by temporary back
and forth movements and return migration (Anghel 2013). Both micro-level evidence from
surveys (Martin and Radu 2012) and aggregate data (Ambrosini et al. 2012), suggest that
for Romania as well as other East and Central European countries, return migration is a
substantial share of total gross migration flows. In Romania at the level of 2008, the share of
returnees in the total working age population was about 10 per cent (Martin and Radu 2012).
The Romanian migration to Italy was characterized by a negative selection: most migrants
were less skilled, already had a longer migration history, often involving informal or illegal
employment spells, and made use of network ties established in their communities of origin
(Anghel 2013, Elrick and Ciobanu 2009). There were notable peaks over the last decade.
Most of these correspond to past regularization programmes. For a discussion of irregular
migrants and previous regularisation programmes in Italy see Reyneri (1998) and Fasani
(2010).1 Figure 3 indicates that the year 2007 was also a peak year in term of net migration,
with registered flows double in size compared to the year before. The stock of Romanians in
Italy grew thus by about 100 per cent in 2007 only (according to OECD SOPEMI 2009 figures,
760,000 Romanian citizens resided in Italy by 2008). An increase of this is most probably
caused mainly by statistical reasons: Romanian migrants who resided in Italy before January
2007 could regularize their status under the free movement of labour in the EU after Romania
joined the EU. However, due to its sheer magnitude and its visibility in statistics and public
1In a recent study, Devillanova, Fasani, and Fratttini (2014) exploit the 2002 amnesty program in Italy
using NGO data to analyse the impact of the prospect of legalization on undocumented immigrants’ employ-
ment outcomes.
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debates, this sharp increase in the official number of Romanian migrants is likely to have led
to strong anti-immigration sentiments.
2.2 Media, attitudes and immigration in Italy
Between 1990 and 2010 the overall share of the foreign-born residents in Italy grew dramat-
ically, from 0.8 per cent in 1990 to more than 7 per cent in 2010. This strong increase in a
relative short period of time was accompanied by fears and anti-immigrant attitudes among
the native population. In 2007, Italians overwhelmingly considered immigration as a big
problem in their country and believed that migrants from both the Middle East and North
African and from Eastern Europe were having a bad impact on their country (Horowitz 2010).
Data from the PEW Global Attitudes Survey suggest that at the level of 2007 (the data were
collected before the events upon which we focus in this paper) Italians were on average the
strongest supporters of tightening immigration controls among all European countries (Figure
4): 87 per cent were in favour of tightening migration controls, compared to "only" 77 per
cent in Spain and 75 per cent in the UK, the other two countries which received massive
inflows of labour migrants from Eastern Europe.
Our own estimates based on data from the Flash Eurobarometer 257/2009, support this
finding indicating that Italians consider migration (free movement of persons) to be one
of the most problematic issues when it comes to (future) EU enlargements (see Figure 5).
This strong opinion on migration in relation to EU enlargement is shared with citizens of
the UK, another main destination country of migration flows from Eastern Europe after
the Eastern enlargement of the EU. The same holds true when it comes to opinions on the
relationship of migration and crime. According to the figures of the Transatlantic Trend
Survey on Immigration in 2008, about one third of the respondents in UK and Italy agreed
strongly to the statement that immigration in general will increase crime in their society.
On average, only 22 per cent of European and 25 per cent of US respondents shared this
pessimistic view. In addition to this the figures of the Transatlantic survey suggest, that the
broad majority of Italians (68 per cent) think that most immigrants are residing illegally in
Italy. For comparison, only 15 per cent of the German and 34 per cent UK respondents think
in a similar way about the migrants in their country.
Against this backdrop, it is easier to understand how a widely publicized crime committed
by a Romanian migrant can fuel a national press campaign and trigger a public outrage against
Romanian migrants living in Italy.
The immigration-crime nexus makes regular headlines in the Italian media. During the
period around 2007, 60 per cent of news related to any form of crime had an immigrant as
protagonist (Morcellini 2009). The coverage of immigration was related in 36 percent of the
news to terrorism and criminality and in other 36 per cent to illegal migration (Morcellini
2009). The TV is the most used medium and represents the exclusive source of information
for a large proportion of the population (D‘Avanzo 2007, Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali
2007). The media in Italy is historically highly polarised (Hallin and Mancini 2004) and
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characterised by partisan bias (Durante and Knight 2012). The Italian TV was characterised
by a duopoly between the public service broadcaster RAI and the media network controlled
by former prime-minister Silvio Berlusconi. Particularly during the period around 2007, the
two networks differed considerably in the way they represented immigration in Italy. During
this period, the Prodi II Cabinet (2006-2008) governed Italy supported by coalition of the
entire parliamentary left wing. Berlusconi did not control the public broadcaster RAI, like
he did after his return to office in May 2008. Mastrorocco and Minale (2015) provide an
excellent analysis of the impact of media on crime perception in Italy after 2007. They do not
distinguish between Mediaset and Rai in their study and cover mainly the representation of
crime not the crime-migration nexus. But they suggest implicitly that during our period of
interest around 2007, compared to the periods immediately before and after, the two networks
were more likely to differ in the representation of crime - precisely because Berlusconi had
less influence over the Rai network during this period.
The RAI channels (RAI 1, RAI 2, RAI 3) abide to a public service mission and
attempted to cover themes around race, immigration and diversity in a balanced way. Themes
around diversity or addressing problems from the perspective of migrants hardly featured in
any Mediaset programmes. These are more leaning towards the ideological right and use
a more pronounced stereotyping perspective on immigration. Only RAI channels devoted
transmission time to immigration specific programmes: 93 percent of this time was on RAI 2
and 7 percent of it onRAI 3 (Morcellini 2009). The Mediaset channels (Rettequattro, Canale
cinque, Italia Uno) devoted two times more prime transmission time than RAI to crime and
security issues (Durante and Knight 2012) often linked to crimes committed by immigrants or
to illegal immigration (Diamanti 2008). The Mediaset news programmes “telegiornali” (TG4,
TG5 and Studio Aperto) covered 60 percent more news on crime and migration than their
RAI counterparts (TG1, TG2 and TG3) taken together (Diamanti 2008).
2.3 The "Tor di Quinto" events
Compared to the first semester of 2007, the number of news on migration and crime increased
dramatically in the second semester of 2007 on both networks. On RAI news programmes it
almost doubled, from 888 to 1,400, on Mediaset it increased by less than a third from 1,500 to
about 1,900 (Diamanti 2008). The reason for this increase was a crime committed on October
30th 2007 by a Romanian migrant of Roma origin. He robbed and savagely beat an Italian
woman, the wife of a navy officer who was returning home along a poorly lit road in the Tor
di Quinto periphery of Rome. The victim subsequently died in hospital.
This incident appeared to be the “final straw that resulted in an explosive debate on
safety and security in Italy, coinciding with the presentation by the government of its Security
Package on 30 October” (Sartori 2008). The case spurred an unprecedented negative public
reaction against Romanian immigrants. At the same time, the media reaction went well
beyond the specific case both in Italy (generating a debate around the so called ‘Romanian
emergency‘) as well as in Romania, having European wide echoes in the press (not only via
6
the TV but also in the print media e.g. the headline of Corriere della Sera: ‘The spectre of
monsters from Europe: Is the Romanian bogeyman destined to become Italians‘ nightmare?).2
Only three weeks later, the Italian government passed a decree to allow the police and
judiciary to expel immigrants who are deemed to be a threat to public order. Then opposition
leader Silvio Berlusconi urged Italy to close its borders to Romanian workers and his conser-
vative ally called for the expulsion of tens of thousands of immigrants. The crisis brought at
that time the Romanian Prime Minister to Rome for an emergency meeting with his Italian
counterpart.
What singled out this decree and shocked the public opinion was that it aimed so openly at
Romanians leading to the "securitization" (Boswell 2007) of the debate on Romanian migrants
in Italy. Its preamble claimed that “the proportion of crimes committed by foreigners has
increased, and those who commit most crimes are the Romanians.” Newspapers reported this
to be true only in absolute terms, Romanians being the most numerous group of migrants
in Italy, but not in relative terms. La Stampa’s own analysis finds that the proportion of
Romanians reported to, or arrested by, the police in 2006 was lower than in most other
foreign groups.
There were some voices raised against the decree. These included the Pope warning
against racism and paranoia in Italy and the head of Italy’s criminal lawyer’s association
who initiated a protest against the emergency decree. The number of actual deportations
is not available, but during the month following the "Tor di Quinto" events, less than 200
deportations were reported, in contrast to the 200,000 demanded by Fini and the 20,000
promised by the government. While the policy reaction remained at the level of rhetoric, the
public reaction via discourses, media and general attitudes was massive. Since the suspect was
of Roma origin and resided in a temporary Roma camp, the bulk of media attacks targeted
this group, but also led to a backlash against Romanians in general.
In these circumstances, it seems worth while to try to analyse the impact of such a shock
in public attitudes on the return intentions of Romanian migrants. We use in our motivation
the shock as it was reflected by the media. But there was a remarkable change in individual
attitudes over this period depicted in the repeated survey of the Fondazione Unipolis, Demos
and Pi on security issues and perceived threats in the population. The second semester of 2007
is the single period in which negative attitudes on immigration in Italy ("immigration poses
threat to public order and security") prevail over the perceived positive effects of migration
and diversity ("the presence of migrants enriches the cultural development of Italy") while
the opposite is the case for all waves before and after this period (Diamanti 2008).
2Specifically dealing with the "Tor di Quinto" events and their aftermath, some selected headlines from
across the major international press include:
“Italy starts deporting Romanians”, BBC-News, 05.11.2007
“Italian woman’s murder prompts expulsion threat to Romanians”, The Guardian, 02.11.2007
“Brutal Attack in Rome: Italy Cracks Down on Immigrant Crime Wave”, Der Spiegel, 02.11.2007
“Rome veut d’urgence expulser les immigrés délinquants”, Le Figaro, 05.11.2007
“Italy: Prodi Defends Expulsions of Romanians”, Agence France Press (AFP), 06.11.2007
“Italy and immigration: Disharmony and tension”, The Economist, 08.11.2007
“Romanian Premier Tries to Calm Italy After a Killing”, The New York Times, 08.11.2007
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In order to do so, we use data from a survey on Romanian migrants in Italy carried out
only a few weeks after the events. The survey and the variables included are described in the
next section. It includes a battery of questions on media consumption in Italy which enables
us to identify respondents with previous exposure to xenophobic manifestations. The data
allow us to uncover the underlying factors in the variation of return and settlement intentions
as a reaction to the shock in public opinion. We use a broader understanding of native
attitudes to incorporate both the public opinion reflected by the media and the policy level
attitudes reflected in governmental reactions (like the emergency decree for the expulsion of
EU citizens).
3 Data and method
3.1 The RCI survey
Our analysis relies on data from a broad-purpose survey covering the Romanian Community
in Italy (RCI). The survey was commissioned by the Romanian government through the
Agency for Government Strategies ("Agenţia pentru Strategii Guvernamentale"). It aimed to
gather accurate and detailed information on the situation of Romanian migrants residing in
Italy after Romania joined the EU. A single wave of interviews was carried out in the period
20 November to 15 December 2007 on a country wide representative sample of about 1,100
Romanian migrants (over 18 years of age and excluding short term seasonal migrants and
tourists).
For the RCI survey, a two-stage sample design was used to select regions and four types
of local administrative units ("comuni") based on the number of Romanian migrants. This
sampling frame was constructed using Istat data on the distribution of Romanian migrants
across Italian regions, localities and neighborhoods. Regions with a very small number of
Romanian migrants were not sampled3, questionnaires being eventually distributed in fifteen
regions and sixty "comuni". The majority of migrants were sampled from the main destination
regions of Romanian migrants in Italy: Lazio (28 per cent), Lombardy (18 per cent), Veneto
(17 per cent) and Piedmont (11 per cent). The rest were split among the other regions
according to the Istat data on the ratio of Romanian migrants. About 25 per cent of the
interviewed migrants resided in big cities: Rome (10.5 per cent), Torino (8.5 per cent) and
Milano (6 per cent). The other were evenly distributed among medium sized, smaller towns
and rural areas. Within neighbourhoods, blocks of buildings and households were selected
randomly and the persons interviewed were sampled using a date of birth criterion. No more
than five persons were included from the same street and no more than two from the same
block.
The RCI survey gathered detailed information on socio-demographic characteristics, mi-
gration biographies, employment in Italy, ties to the region of origin in Romania, social
3These are: Basilicata, Calabria, Molise, Puglia, Valle D’Aosta.
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interactions in the Romanian community and with the Italian society, general life satisfac-
tion, and several questions covering migration plans. These include: settlement plans in Italy,
intentions to return to Romania or to move onwards to a third destination country.
Fortunately for the purpose of our study, the RCI survey was carried out 3 to 5 weeks
after the "Tor di Quinto" events, after the peak of the media scandal and after the debates
around the emergency decree for the immediate expulsion of citizens of other European Union
countries. It was therefore possible to include an additional battery of questions in the RCI
survey to cover the perception of and reaction to recent developments in the aftermath of the
"Tor di Quinto" events. In particular, the RCI survey contains retrospective information on
the perception of the socio-economic situation in Italy and Romania as well as on outmigration
intentions. With respect to the latter, we make use of a question which asks whether the
participant revised his/her settlement intention following the "Tor di Quinto" events.4 We
combined this measure of revised settlement intentions with a question on current settlement
plans5 to construct a time varying measure of settlement intentions. The fact that the "Tor
di Quinto" events happened only 3 to 5 weeks before the interview should foster a good
perception of current and past settlements intentions. In other words, the recall bias should
be very limited. The corresponding variable is a dummy coded as one if a respondent plans
to settle in Italy on a long term basis and has no concrete plans to either return to Romania
or move to a third destination. This allows us to identify changes in migration plans by
comparing settlement intentions before and after the "Tor di Quinto" events.6
A similar approach has been used before by Friebel, Gallego, and Mendola (2013). They
combine survey data on current migration intentions with retrospective information on past
migration intentions (1 year earlier) to study the change in migration intentions of Mozambi-
cans in reaction to xenophobic violence in South Africa. The use of retrospective information
on migration has a long tradition in social science. Among others, Pissarides and Wadsworth
(1989) have used a retrospective question in the UK Labour Force Survey to identify internal
migrants in the United Kingdom. McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) have exploited retrospective
information in Mexican survey data to identify migrants to the US. A more recent example
is the work of Mezger Kveder and Beauchemin (2014) who have studied the impact of
migration on home country investment using retrospective questions to measure migration
periods of Senegalese respondents in the "Migration between Africa and Europe" survey.
What makes the RCI data particularly interesting for our research are the detailed ques-
tions on media consumption. These include the main sources used for information about
current affairs in Italy, the exact names of the main TV channels and the frequency of use.
The survey allocated a special weight to this section because it initially aimed at covering the
formation of attitudes among Romanian migrants in relation to the overwhelmingly bad press
4The exact question is: "Did you revise your settlement intention as a result of the ’Tor di Quinto’ events"?
5"Do you intend to settle in Italy on a long term basis without migration plans in the next two years?".
6The RCI survey includes a few additional retrospective questions related to the perceptions of re-
spondents when they arrived in Italy. We use the questions to test the validity of our empirical identification
strategy in Section 5.
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they faced in host countries across Europe. All respondents indicate to have been using the
TV as source of information on current affairs in Italy. More than ninety per cent mention it
as the single main source and use the TV daily or more times a week.
These questions allow us to identify migrants who were exposed to the Mediaset channels
and those who used instead the state TV (RAI) as their source of information about Italy
before the Tor di Quinto events. The survey question we use is: "Name the main TV
channel you have been using as source of information on Italy". The question is
asked about TV habits not related to the Tor di Quinto events but to the usual, long-term
media preferences. We cannot entirely rule out that immigrants changed their main Italian
TV-channels after the events. But this does not affect our identification strategy or the
estimated impact as long as the answers do not suffer from systematic recall bias. Also,
inertia in TV consumption patterns observed in other studies reassure us that
short-term changes in TV behaviour such as the choice of the main channel are
unlikely to bias significantly our results. We assign respondents into the two groups
using the channel identified by respondents as the primary source of information. Among
those respondents using the state TV channels, about 67 per cent used RAI 1, 27 per cent
RAI 2 and only 6 per cent RAI 3. Among the Mediaset users, the majority chose Canale 5
(43 per cent) or Italia 1 (25 per cent), followed by Rete 4 (7 per cent) and an even split over
the remaining Mediaset channels.
In Table 1 we compare the main characteristics for respondents with and without exposure
to Mediaset channels. We selected these variables using the standard framework of a human
capital (return) migration model and included also some additional regional characteristics.7
In contrast to settlement intentions, which serves as our dependent variable, all covariates refer
to the time of the interview (i.e. after the "Tor di Quinto" events) and do not vary over time.
The t-tests included in the last two columns of Table 1 indicate that the two groups are not
only similar in size, but also are comparable with respect to many individual characteristics
like gender, household income, work effort, attitudes towards the situation and perception of
Romanian migrants in the Italian society. There are also no statistically significant differences
between the two groups with regard to variables we expect to be highly correlated with return
migration: remittances, integration in Italy (having or not Italian friends), to be or not a
tied migrant (family migration decisions), religious affiliation (documented to be a strong
predictor of migration and return due to specific network ties in Romania and abroad) and
house ownership in Romania. Migrants exposed to Mediaset channels are more likely to be
younger, to have been residents in Italy for longer periods, to be on average slightly more fluent
in Italian, and less likely to be informally employed. They are also more likely to consider
that the Italian media reacted in a tendentious way to the "Tor di Quinto" events. However,
with regard to the selection into media exposure based on education there is no clear pattern.
Mediaset exposed migrants are at the same time less likely to have only a low level of education
and to be highly skilled compared to migrants who were not exposed to Mediaset channels. As
7A detailed description of the variables can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix.
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a consequence they are significantly more likely to have a medium level of education. We will
control for all these observable characteristics in the various specifications of our regression
based difference-in-differences models. But the otherwise rather neutral selection into media
exposure is worth noting and important for the discussion of our results.
3.2 The Difference-in-Differences approach
One reason why migrants choose either of the two types of TV channels can be due to dif-
ferent preferences making them more likely to consume mass media with a specific content.
However, based on the perceptions about Italy facilitated by the media, they will also form
expectations with regard to their optimal migration and integration strategies and the con-
straints they might face in the host society. Given the potential self-selection into the type
of media migrants consume, we have no a priori expectations about the correlation between
the frequency of anti-immigrant expressions in the chosen media and the intended duration
of stay in the destination country. The RCI data suggest a small difference between migrants
exposed to Mediaset and those exposed to the state TV - the former being slightly less likely
to have settlement intentions in Italy (see Table 2), but the difference is not statistically
significant (t = 0.654).
However, we would expect migrants exposed to different media to react in different ways
to a shock in public attitudes of the magnitude reached after the "Tor di Quinto" events.
Migrants who use Mediaset controlled TV channels as their main source of information are
more frequently exposed to anti-immigrant sentiments and used to the stereotyping attitudes
propagated by this media. We expect them to be therefore less likely to react to the shock in
attitudes after 30.10.2007 as their counterparts who used other TV channels as main source of
information in Italy. We define the group exposed to Mediaset channels as our control group.
For those who did not use Mediaset channels, the Tor di Quinto events and the subsequent
reaction came as a large amplitude shock. They are our treatment group because they were not
exposed to negative attitudes through Italian media before "Tor di Quinto". This definition
of treatment and control groups informs our baseline difference-in-differences approach.
By exploiting this variation in media consumption among Romanian migrants, our inten-
tion is to establish a causal link between changes in public attitudes and settlement intentions.
The validity of our approach is based on the assumption that, other things being equal, the
trend in settlement intentions in the group of migrants who are exposed to the Mediaset chan-
nels will be the same as among those who are not exposed. The common trend assumption
would therefore imply that the settlement intentions in each of the two groups were moving
in a parallel way before the shock. In Section 5, we will provide some evidence testing the
validity of this assumption. By now, we assume that the trends in settlement intentions
between treatment and control group were identical before the "Tor di Quinto"
events.
Besides the raw difference-in-differences estimation presented in Table 2 and discussed in
the next section, we also assess how robust these are to the introduction of control variables.
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In order to do this we estimate a probit equation of the type:
P (settlementit = 1) = Φ[α+ β · Zit + γ0 ·No mediaset exposurei (1)
+ γ1 · post "Tor di Quinto"t
+ γ2 · (No mediaset exposure× post "Tor di Quinto")it] + εit
where settlementit is a dichotomous variable taking the value one if the respondent i plans
to stay in Italy at time t. Z is a vector of personal characteristics (in our data most of them
are time invariant), while No mediaset exposurei is a dummy variable taking the value one
if the respondent does not use Berlusconi owned Mediaset programs as the main source of
information and post"Tor di Quinto"t takes the value one for the time after October 30th,
2007. The coefficient for the interaction of these two dummy variables, γ2 is of interest for
our analysis but its magnitude does not represent the partial effect. We therefore estimated
the predicted response in settlement intentions for those who were not exposed to Mediaset
channels at the means of the covariates and report this in the last row of Table 3.8
4 Discussion of the results
We present some prima facie evidence on the impact of "Tor di Quinto" on settlement inten-
tions of Romanian migrants in Table 2. This includes the unconditional differences in average
settlement intentions in Italy before and after the "Tor di Quinto" events for our treatment
and control groups, as well as the simple difference-in-differences (DiD).
Our treatment group are all Romanian immigrants who are following the news through
media non-affiliated with the Berlusconi press (non-Mediaset). As already mentioned, our
assumption is that those media channels projected a more balanced picture of the impact
of immigration on Italy. Immigrants who followed those media were therefore not exposed to
very negative views from the national media towards themselves before the "Tor di Quinto"
events. We find that those immigrants expressed a greater tendency to settle in Italy before
the events (the p-value on the difference is 0 up to the fourth decimal point). Quite striking is
the reduction in those intentions to settle following the "Tor di Quinto" events. Around a third
of immigrants in this group revised their intention to settle (i.e. a reduction of 20 percentage
points from .66 to .46) and expressed intentions to return in their origin country or to move
on to third destination countries. This reduction exceeds by far the reduction in settlement
intentions amongst Romanian immigrants who were used to negative views on immigration
through media (i.e. our control group). Immigrants who were regularly using the Berlusconi
media did indeed also reduce their intention to settle but by far less than our treated sample.
Only 15 per cent changed their mind after "Tor di Quinto". One obvious interpretation of
these results is that the shock caused by the huge media coverage of the events was much
8We also estimated panel models using the time dimension available. The results from fixed and random
effects models are reported in Table A4 in the appendix.
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greater for immigrants who were not accustomed to being stereotyped and portrayed in non-
favourable light. This is a potentially important and interesting result showing for the first
time the size of the impact that media can have on intentions to settle. The difference-in-
differences indicates a reduction of 9.8 percentage points and significantly different from nil
(p-value= .021). The size of the corresponding impact on intentions to settle in Italy equals
14 per cent.
Table 3 reports the results from our probit model outlined in equation (1). The first
column in Table 3 re-produces the coefficient corresponding to the difference-in-differences
reported in Table 2. In column 2, we add the socio-demographic controls available in our data
set. We observe that the coefficient of interest tends to increase slightly and remains highly
significant. In columns (3) to (5) we introduce more variables that can potentially reverse
or affect the tendency to settle in the host country. The addition of variables capturing
links to the Italian society as well as the migrants’ own perception of native attitudes and
of the media reaction (column 3) tends to increase slightly the main coefficient of interest.
The same holds true if we control for additional migration characteristics (column 4) like the
type of migration (tied migrant), household links to Romania (land and house ownership) as
well as the migrants’ revealed own views on the impact of migration. Adding regional fixed
effects, controlling for regions of origin in Romania and regions of residence in Italy, tend to
further increase the main coefficient of interest and the corresponding predicted response in
settlement intentions. Overall, the addition of a large number of control variables does not
greatly affect the value and significance of coefficients. Our preferred estimate of the response
in settlement intentions is .11 per cent, with a standard-error of .046 and consequently a
p-value of .017. This means that intentions to settle have decreased amongst the Romanian
immigrants following the media coverage of "Tor di Quinto" by 11 percentage points with a
base value of 66 per cent, i.e. an impact of almost 17 per cent.
5 Extensions and falsification tests
The nature of selection into return migration is of crucial importance for the long term
developmental impact of migration on the sending countries. We are therefore particularly
interested if the impact of native attitudes on settlement intentions is random or if it affects
the selection of return migrants.
In order to investigate this, we need to find the partial effects on sub-groups based on
education, age, Italian language fluency and labour market experience proxied by years since
migration in Italy.9 We estimate therefore probit models similar to that from equation (1)
but incorporating triple interaction terms (DDD) with dummy variables which define the
sub-group of interest:
9We also run sub-group models based on regions of residence in Italy but did not find any significant
effects. The effect for the sub-group of migrants located in Lazio (i.e. in relative proximity to the crime scene)
compared to migrants in the North (Piedmont and Lombardy) is as expected negative (we observe a reduction
in settlement intentions) but with no statistical significance (the corresponding p-value is 0.718).
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P (settlementit = 1) = Φ[α+ β · Zit + γ1 ·No mediaset exposurei (2)
+ γ2 · post "Tor di Quinto"t + γ3 · subgroupi
+ γ12 · (No mediaset exposure× post "Tor di Quinto")it
+ γ13 · (No mediaset exposure× subgroup)i
+ γ23 · (subgroup× post "Tor di Quinto")it
+ γ123 · (No mediaset exposure× post "Tor di Quinto"× subgroup)it] + εit
where all variables are the same as in (1) and subgroupi takes the value one if respondent
i belongs to the sub-group of interest.
Table 4 shows the results of the sub-group analysis. It reports the estimates for education
groups (low, medium and high), for language fluency (based on a constructed dummy variable
indicating whether the respondents are fluent in Italian), for recent migrants (those who
arrived earlier than the median number of years since migration in the sample) and age
(migrants over forty years of age).
The first column in Table 4 present the raw difference-in-differences for the sub-groups
while columns (2) and (3) include covariates.10 These results were estimated using triple
interaction terms and predicting the marginal effects at the means of the covariates using
third differentials. Given our interest in the implications of our results for the potential
self-selection into (having intentions to) out-migration, it is worth noting that hardly any
sub-group effects are statistically significant. Most effects are much smaller than our baseline
results for the whole sample.
The only group for which the impact is statistically significant at 5 per cent is that for low
education. After the inclusion of covariates the magnitude of the effect for this group is above
the one estimated for the whole sample being 13 percentage points, with a corresponding p-
value of .03. In other words, low educated migrants were decreasing their intentions to settle
in Italy on a medium to long term basis by 13 percentage points which given the base value
of 70 per cent in the group, suggest a reduction of settlement intentions by about 20 per cent.
The implications for the selection into settlement and out-migration are straightforward. The
implied positive selection into settlement means that without accounting for out-migration
any predictions of the integration prospects of migrants in Italy will be biased upwards. Even
if out-migration intentions are not realise, those belonging to the lower educated might have
less incentives to invest in specific skills or language and will face a long term disadvantage.
Moreover, the described selection pattern is likely to reduce the potential gains of return
migration for the sending country. Piracha and Vadean (2010) have shown that low skilled
return migrants are less likely to engage in entrepreneurial activities than skilled returners.
10In column 2 we control for socio-demographic and migration characteristics as well as for variables mea-
suring integration. The results in column 2 are therefore comparable with the results in column 4 of Table 3.
The results reported in column 3 are comparable to those of column 5 in Table 3.
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The same holds true for failed migrants who leave the destination country before they have
reached their savings goal. For the case of Egypt, Marchetta (2012) has demonstrated that
migration experience also increases the survival rate of entrepreneurial activities and by this
generates a long-term contribution to employment creation. The fact that return migrants
are negatively selected in terms of education and leave the destination earlier is likely to
reduce two main benefits of return migration: entrepreneurial take-up and sustainability of
self-employment. It is also very likely to impact on the saving behavior of migrants and
eventually on both the magnitude and the use of remittances in the home country (Piracha
and Zhu 2012).
Our data do not allow us to include a placebo period in the analysis. Since the time period
we are concerned with is very short, i.e. one month before and after the "Tor di Quinto" events,
it is highly unlikely that our difference-in-differences results are due to some other events
occurring in the same period. However, we want to rule out the possibility that our estimated
relationship between a shock in anti-immigrant sentiments and settlement intentions may
capture omitted factors that affect for example both the choices over media consumption and
the intended duration of stay in Italy. Such factors could be related e.g. to unobserved affinity
for the culture or local amenities in the destination country, or to preferences over consumption
in the region of origin which affect migrants’ attitudes towards the host society. We construct
two types of falsification tests in order to increase the confidence that our results are not driven
by such hidden biases due to omitted characteristics. First, we perform the same difference-
in-differences analysis on our treatment and control groups but using a "fake" outcome, i.e.
an outcome known to be unaffected by the treatment (Rosenbaum 2002). Second, we use our
outcome of primary interest, settlement intentions in the destination country, but we define
the treatment and control groups for the difference-in-differences analysis such that they are
not affected by the shock in public attitudes. In both cases we should find no significant
impacts. This would support our interpretation that the relationship between a shock in
native attitudes and settlement intentions is not coincidental and unlikely to be driven by
omitted variables.
We use first three sets of variables which record the perception of Romanian migrants
with regard to the politico-economic situation in Romania before and after the events. These
variables cover: (i) the overall economic conditions in Romania, (ii) the employment and
labour market situation and (iii) the political context and the functioning of institutions.
The change in these perceptions should not be affected by the shock in native attitudes. For
all three variables, we run the same models as in equations (1) and (2) using the same controls
but the perception variables as "fake" outcome. The results are reported in Table 5 for both
the DD effects (first row) and the subgroup effects using third differences (DDD). None the
effects is statistically significant.
This means that in terms of outcomes which could not reasonably be caused by a shock
in native attitudes, our treatment and control groups are not statistically different, which is
what we would expect had the media exposure been assigned at random.
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Similarly, for the second set of tests, we change the definition of our treatment using those
who have negative perceptions on the situations in Romania as our "fake" control group and
those with neutral or positive perceptions as treatment while keeping our main outcome of
interest (settlement intention in the host country). The main rational here is that people
who have negative opinion on their origin country should not revise their settlement intention
following the "Tor di Quinto" event in comparison to those who have no such negative opinions
about their origin country. All three outcomes (i.e. overall economy, labour market and
political context) measuring negative perceptions of the situation in Romania are positively
correlated to settlement intentions. We run again the same models as in equations (1) and (2)
but using the perception variables to define the treatment groups and keeping our outcome
of primary interest as dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 6 where each
column corresponds to one of the three definitions of treatment and control groups and they
show no significance at all. We therefore do not find an impact of the shock in attitudes on
settlement intentions when using alternate treated and control groups, which we interpret as
further support for our identification strategy.
The results from Tables 5 and 6 are consistent with the absence of bias in our estimation.
They support our hypothesis that changes in native attitudes have a significant impact on
settlement intentions in the destination country and this is not driven by omitted character-
istics.
Finally, we investigate whether our results are affected by different pre-trends. Our identi-
fication strategy relies on the assumption that individuals in our treatment and control group
follow the same time trend behaviour in settlement intentions. In other words, trends in
settlement intentions are assumed to be the same for Mediaset and non-Mediaset watchers in
the absence of the "Tor di Quinto" events. Evidence in support of the parallel trends assump-
tion comes from our additional results in Table 5 in which we use retrospective information
on perceptions of the situation in Romania. If our treatment and control group would have
been characterized by different time trends in settlement intentions, it would be very likely
that the two groups also have different time trends with respect to related outcomes. We
therefore would expect to find significant differences between the two groups when looking
at outcomes related to settlement intentions that are likely to be unaffected by the "Tor di
Quinto" events. However, we do not find any significant differences in long run trends be-
tween the two groups when looking at changes in perceptions on the evolution of economic
conditions, the labour market situation and the political context in Romania. This speaks in
favour of our assumption that trends in settlement intentions did not differ.
To provide more support for our parallel trends assumption, we combine our DiD esti-
mation with propensity score matching (e.g.Blundell and Dias 2009) and apply the method
suggested by Villa (2011). We do this first without covariates replicating the method for Ta-
ble 2, but using weights based on the propensity score. The corresponding results, reported
in the appendix in Table A5, are very similar to the estimates in Table 2. We do then the
same exercise but conditioning on observable characteristics, i.e. replicating Table 3, and
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obtain the estimates provided in Table A6 in the appendix. The results are very similar to
those reported in the last column of Table 3. This is further evidence that the differences in
observable characteristics do not cause bias and do not affect the credibility of our parallel
trends assumption.
6 Conclusions
The out-migration rate of foreign born after five years of residency varies greatly across the
main destinations countries: e.g. it was on average 20 percent in the US, 40 percent in the
UK, and 60 percent in Ireland (Dumont and Spielvogel 2008). The self-selection of return
migrants leads to important compositional changes in the cohorts of foreign born who remain
at destination. These changes are crucial for understanding both the economic assimilation of
immigrants in the host societies and the impact of return migration for the source countries.
Lubotsky (2007) shows that not accounting for selective return migration leads to overestimat-
ing the rate of economic assimilation during the first decade spent in the host country. There
is to date no conclusive evidence about what determines the selection into return migration.
After the 2008 economic crisis, several major destination countries saw a surge in support
for nationalist and populist parties. This led mainstream politicians to adopt harsh anti-
immigration positions. In this context, negative attitudes towards migration can greatly
influence choices over return migration. However, the effects of native attitudes on out-
migration decisions has not been studied extensively in the empirical economics literature.
One novelty of our study lies in uncovering a significant relationship between changes
in public attitudes and migrants’ settlement intentions. We exploit the variation in media
consumption among Romanian migrants in Italy and use data after a unique shock in the
attitudes of Italians towards Romanian migrants. Our results indicate that Romanian mi-
grants who have been affected by the sharply hardened native attitudes are less likely to plan
to settle in Italy. We find a reduction in settlement intentions on average by more than 10
percent that can be attributed to the change in natives’ attitudes.
Two types of potential implications derive from our findings: short-run effects on im-
migrants’ current choices and long-run effects on their socio-cultural integration in the host
country. Due to the nature of our data, we identified in the paper the current (short-term)
impact of native attitudes on return intentions. This effect might fade away so that migrants
not only settle at destination but also change their return intentions over the migration biogra-
phy. But our result remains socially and economically relevant. Many of the choices made by
migrants (like e.g. remittances, investment in language acquisition, degree of interaction with
natives) depend to a larger extent on current, short-term plans than on future realizations of
return intentions (see e.g. Dustmann and Mestres 2010). The link we identify between native
attitudes and return intentions becomes even more important if native attitudes continuously
deteriorate, like they did in most European receiving countries in the period after the events
we study. Recent Eurobarometer surveys show that immigration has become by far the single
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most important concern of EU citizens (European Commission 2015). In this context, current
(short-term) return intentions can persist and even without being realized can impede im-
migrants’ integration, e.g. by diminishing their direct interactions with natives (Danzer and
Yaman 2013). Besides, looking at official Italian immigration data (Istat 2014) we find some
tentative evidence that the 2007 events might have impacted on the actual outmigration flows
of Romanian citizens from Italy. The absolute number of Romanians leaving Italy in 2008
more than doubled compared to the previous year (2007). No other immigrant community
in Italy experienced an increase in outflows of a similar magnitude for this period. Moreover,
the number of Romanians leaving Italy continued to increase in subsequent years, although
the inflows from Romania decreased steadily.
The impact we identify on return and settlement intentions is not coincidental. And less
skilled migrants are more affected by the shock in attitudes than medium and highly skilled
migrants. The implications for destinations countries of immigrants are straightforward if we
believe that the effect of native attitudes on settlement intentions is not purely temporary
in nature. Negative attitudes affect migrants who have the lowest skills and therefore low-
est earnings in a particular cohort. They will face reduced incentives to invest in country
specific skills or language. If they do return, any predictions on the economic assimilation
of immigrants will have to be adjusted downwards to account for the negative selection into
return migration. If they stay in the host country, persistent return intentions will hamper
their socio-economic integration. The implications for the sending countries are manifold.
The recent tide in anti-immigrant feelings may induce more return migrants from the lower
end of the skill distribution in any immigrant cohort. This reduces the expected benefits from
temporary migration. Changes in intended durations of stay may also affect both the mag-
nitude and the use of remittances sent from abroad. This in turn might reduce the potential
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Figure 2: Romanian migrants abroad at the level of 2011 (Source: Romanian 2012 Census
data). West Europe includes: France, Belgium, Portugal, Austria. North Europe includes:
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Figure 3: Net migration to Italy (Source: Istat)
Figure 4: Attitudes towards tighter immmigration controls (Source: PEW Global Attitudes
Survey, 2007
24
Immigration most important issue
France










0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Fraction of population agree   
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Age 33.281 (9.256) 32.060 (8.703) 1.221 0.028
Woman 0.430 (0.496) 0.432 (0.496) -0.002 0.957
Low education 0.150 (0.357) 0.106 (0.308) 0.044 0.033
Medium education 0.672 (0.469) 0.791 (0.406) -0.118 0.000
High education 0.176 (0,381) 0.102 (0.303) 0.021 0.000
Ethnic Roma 0.119 (0.324) 0.084 (0.278) 0.034 0.066
Informally employed 0.343 (0.475) 0.235 (0.424) 0.108 0.000
Log wage / month 5.281 (0.419) 5.342 (0.476) -0.060 0.071
Hours work / day 8.179 (1.717) 8.342 (1.468) -0.163 0.130
HH income / month 1663.292 (1008.958) 1774.420 (1079.339) -111.128 0.147
Years in Italy 3.809 (3.162) 4.547 (3.345) -0.738 0.000
Fluent in Italian 0.699 (0.459) 0.755 (0.431) -0.056 0.042
Minority religion 0.166 (0.373) 0.195 (0.396) -0.028 0.229
Overall trust 4.743 (2.189) 4.802 (2.126) -0.060 0.654
Negative Roma 0.687 (0.464) 0.759 (0.428) -0.072 0.009
Don‘t migrate 0.487 (0.500) 0.376 (0.485) 0.111 0.000
Worsening opinion 0.717 (0.451) 0.681 (0.467) 0.036 0.200
Deportation justified 0.393 (0.489) 0.442 (0.497) -0.049 0.107
No Italian contacts 0.628 (0.484) 0.610 (0.488) 0.018 0.549
Poor health 0.177 (0.382) 0.139 (0.346) 0.038 0.087
Tied migrant 0.048 (0.214) 0.066 (0.249) -0.018 0.193
Migration negative 0.641 (0.480) 0.687 (0.464) -0.046 0.113
Roma neighbor 0.156 (0.363) 0.080 (0.272) 0.075 0.000
Annual remittances 1668.214 (2966.224) 1541.694 (2585.070) 126.521 0.463
Owns house in Ro. 0.423 (0.494) 0.396 (0.489) 0.027 0.365
Owns land in Ro. 0.320 (0.467) 0.269 (0.444) 0.051 0.068
Share foreign born* 6.409 (1.446) 6.577 (0.931) -0.169 0.026
Share Ro. migrants* 24.049 (10.306) 25.798 (10.041) -1.749 0.005
Unemployment rate* 4.769 (2.167) 4.365 (1.480) 0.404 0.000
Observations 565 498
Notes: The table reports mean values of the descriptive variables for those with and without
exposure to Mediaset controlled media. The p-values correspond to two-tailed t-test of the
equality of the means for the two groups.
* refers to regional characteristics in Italy for 2007 provided by Istat.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment group
Non-Mediaset .663 (.020) .463 (.021) -.200 (.029)
[N = 1, 130]
Control group
Mediaset .644 (.021) .542 (.023) -.102 (.032) -.098 (.043)
[N = 996]
Notes: The table reports mean intentions to settle in Italy of Romanian migrants.
Intention to settle equals one if migrants plan to stay in Italy on a medium to long term basis
and have no concrete plans to return during the next twelve months.
N includes two observations (one pre one post) for n=1,063 Romanian migrants.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































No mediaset×post×low education -.133 -.132 -.138
(.061) (.060) (.061)
No mediaset×post×med. education .083 .088 .093
(.097) (.102) (.105)
No mediaset×post×high education .016 .034 .046
(.127) (.137) (.138)
No mediaset×post×language .037 .041 .120
(fluent in Italian) (.094) (.099) (.253)
No mediaset×post×recent migrant -.004 -.023 -.058
(in Italy less than 3 years) (.090) (.079) (.208)
No mediaset×post×over 40 -.076 -.074 -.071
(older than 40) (.143) (.138) (.141)
Notes: The dependent variable is settlement intentions in Italy. Standard errors in parentheses.
The marginal effects in columns (2) and (3) are are from partial interactions in probit models
using third differences, calculated at means. (Cornelissen and Sonderhof (2009)).
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dependent variable: negative perception of situation in Romania
treatment group: without Mediaset exposure
control group: with Mediaset exposure
No mediaset×post .014 .025 .059
(.033) (.024) (.039)
No mediaset×post×low. education .040 -.023 .043
(.046) (.049) (.079)
No mediaset×post×med. education .058 .029 .058
(.051) (.050) (.051)
No mediaset×post×high education .130 .003 .045
(.144) (.063) (.105)
No mediaset×post×language .080 .021 .080
(fluent in Italian) (.074) (.055) (.074)
No mediaset×post×recent migrant .003 .012 .004
(in Italy less than 3 years) (.053) (.043) (.053)
No mediaset×post×over 40 -.036 -.006 .114
(older than 40) (.070) (.055) (.085)
Notes: The dependent variable takes the value one if the perceptions on the evolution of
economic conditions, the labour market situation and the political context in Romania are
respectively negative and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses.
The marginal effects are from partial interactions in probit models.
For subgroups, these are estimated using third differences.
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dependent variable: settlement intentions at destination
treatment group: negative perception on Romania (col. 1, 2 and 3)
control group: stable perception on Romanian conditions
Negative×post -.033 -.051 .022
(.050) (.058) (.045)
Negative×post×low. education -.045 -.008 .134
(.161) (.152) (.132)
Negative×post×med. education .019 .079 -.054
(.128) (.109) (.100)
Negative×post×high education .038 -.125 -.026
(.169) (.132) (.128)
Negative×post×language .002 .059 -.038
(fluent in Italian) (.130) (.119) (.102)
Negative×post×recent migrant -.025 -.099 -.047
(in Italy less than 3 years) (.118) (.108) (.094)
Negative×post×over 40 -.030 .031 .003
(older than 40) (.171) (.163) (.147)
Notes: The dependent variable is settlement intentions in Italy (same as in tables 2-4).
Standard errors in parentheses.
The marginal effects are from partial interactions in probit models.
For subgroups, these are estimated using third differences.
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Appendix
A Description of variables
Table A1: Characteristics of Romanian migrants in Italy
Variable Definition
Age Constructed using the self-reported year of birth
Woman Dummy based on self reported gender
Low education Low level of education
Medium education Medium level of education
High education High level of education
Ethnic Roma Dummy based on self-reported ethnicity
Informally employed Self reported employment status
Log wage / month Log of net monthly wages
Hours work / day Number of hours usually worked per day
HH income / month Net monthly household income
Years in Italy Years spent in Italy since arrival
Fluent in Italian Self reported proficiency in Italian
Minority religion Dummy based on self-reported religious affiliation
Overall trust Answer yes to "Most people can be trusted"
Negative Roma Has negative a attitude towards Roma
Don’t migrate Romanians should not come to Italy anymore
Worsening opinion Italian attitudes worsened in recent years
Deportation justified Agrees with proposed deportation decree after "Tod di Quinto"
No Italian contacts Has no contacts (friendships) with Italians
Poor health Self reported poor health status
Tied migrant Migrated following a family member
Migration negative Negative attitude towards migrating to Italy
Roma neighbour Does not want Roma people as neighbours
Annual remittances Usual amount of remittances send home per year
Owns house in Ro. Owner of a house/flat in Romania
Owns land in Ro. Owner of land in Romania
Share foreign born (Istat) Share of foreign born in the respondent’s region of residence in Italy
Share Ro. migrants (Istat) Share of Romanians in the respondent’s region of residence in Italy
Unemployment rate (Istat) Unemployment rate in the respondent’s region of residence in Italy
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B Fixed and random effects results
For our dependent variable, "settlement intentions in Italy", we have valid observations for
1,063 Romanian migrants included in our sample. Table A2 provides the number of observa-
tions for each group and period (based on retrospective answers).




"Tor di Quinto" Total
Treatment group
Non-Mediaset 565 565 1,130
Control group
Mediaset 498 498 996
Total 1,063 1,063 2,126
Table A3 describes the variation of our dependent variable ("settlement intentions in
Italy"). We use the panel dimension of the data in our DiD method. In addition, Table A4
provides the results of panel models with individual fixed and random effects. The estimated
coefficients are very similar to those reported in the DiD analysis.
Table A3: Variation in settlement intentions
Settlement intentions Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
overall .577 .494 0 1 N = 2,126
between .453 0 1 n = 1,063
within .196 .077 1 T = 2
The random effects model reported in table A4 includes all covariates from Table 3, column
5 in the paper.
Table A4: Fixed and radom effects models
Fixed effects Random effects
Post x Non-mediaset -.0975 -.0999
(.002) (.022)
Observations 2,126 2,126
Notes: The dependent variable is settlement intentions in Italy. It equals one if migrants plan to stay
in Italy on a medium or long term basis with no concrete plans to return in the next twelve months.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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C Combined Matching and DiD results (MDiD)











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment group
Non-Mediaset .664 (.021) .464 (.021) -.200 (.022)
[N = 1, 130]
Control group
Mediaset .645 (.022) .542 (.059) -.102 (.041) -.098 (0.042)
[N = 996]
Notes: The table reports results from Kernel-based Propensity Score Matching DiD.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Total observations (N) include valid pre- and post- answers for n=1,063 Romanian migrants.











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment group
Non-Mediaset .618 (.059) .416 (.059) -.202 (.030)
[N = 1, 100]
Control group
Mediaset .586 (.059) .484 (.059) -.102 (.040) -.100 (.042)
[N = 982]
Notes: The table reports results from Kernel-based Propensity Score Matching DiD.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Total observations (N) include valid pre- and post- answers for n=1,041 Romanian migrants.
Table A7 lists those covariates used in our model for which we had statistically significant
differences between the treatment and control groups (as reported in Table 1). We show the
distribution of these variables before and after our matching procedure. After the matching
procedure, the means of the pre-treatment variables become very similar for the two groups
(the means are exactly the same for the other variables from Table 1 not shown here). There
are no statistically significant differences between migrants exposed and those not exposed to
Mediaset. We obtain the same results using standardised means.
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(No Mediaset) t-value p-value
Age Unmatched 32.060 33.281 -2.210 0.028
Matched 32.318 33.765 -1.630 0.104
Low education Unmatched 0.106 0.150 -2.130 0.033
Matched 0.100 0.088 0.370 0.711
Medium education Unmatched 0.791 0.673 4.370 0.000
Matched 0.818 0.847 -0.720 0.469
High education Unmatched 0.102 0.177 -3.490 0.000
Matched 0.082 0.065 0.620 0.534
Ethnic Roma Unmatched 0.084 0.119 -1.840 0.066
Matched 0.071 0.106 -1.150 0.253
Informally employed Unmatched 0.235 0.343 -3.900 0.000
Matched 0.335 0.341 -0.110 0.909
Log wage / month Unmatched 6.985 6.902 2.430 0.015
Matched 6.947 6.895 1.170 0.244
Year in Italy Unmatched 4.547 3.809 3.640 0.000
Matched 3.347 3.218 0.710 0.480
Fluent in Italian Unmatched 0.755 0.699 2.040 0.042
Matched 0.688 0.618 1.370 0.173
Negative to Roma Unmatched 0.759 0.687 2.630 0.009
Matched 0.747 0.753 -0.120 0.901
Poor health Unmatched 0.139 0.177 -1.710 0.087
Matched 0.147 0.112 0.970 0.334
Owns land in Ro. Unmatched 0.269 0.320 -1.830 0.068
Matched 0.294 0.259 0.730 0.468
Share foreign born Unmatched 6.577 6.409 2.230 0.026
Matched 6.529 6.487 0.380 0.705
Share Ro. migrants Unmatched 25.798 24.049 2.790 0.005
Matched 27.611 27.590 0.020 0.984
Unemployment rate Unmatched 4.365 4.769 -3.500 0.000
Matched 4.636 4.740 -0.660 0.508
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